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2INTRODUCTION
An important problem in the study of attitudes is how
attitudes are acquired. One approach is that of applying
the principles of learning theory to attitude formation.
It is generally agreed that most, if not all, attitudes
are learned. Perhaps one's attitude toward sweetness in
general is physiologically determined, but certainly one's
reactions to most attitude objects are not innate. So if
attitude acquisition can be placed within the broad concep-
tual framework of learning theory, what is the mechanism
involved? An attempt to answer this question has been ad-
vanced by Staats and Staats (1957, 1958) in terms of a
classical conditioning model of attitude formation. Cer-
tainly, this approach is only one of many possible concep-
tualizations within the learning framework. Alternative
interpretations of their data rely on a more cognitive
problem-solving explanation (Cohen, 1964; Page, 1969).
Staats and Staats (1957) have extended the thought of
such psychologists as Cofer and Foley (1942), Mowrer (1954)
and Osgood (1952) in a study of the classical conditioning
of meaning. Following Osgood, they view meaning as an im-
plicit detachable component of the total response to an
object. That is, meaning is one part of the response to an
object, and like any other response, can be classically
conditioned. Words can be considered the signs of objects,
3and they elicit a part of the total response to the object
itself. Affective meaning is a portion of the response to
a word. Staats and Staats theorize that if meaning is a
detachable response elicited by a word, then it should be
possible for the meaning response to be classically condi-
tioned to any continuously presented stimulus. So a non-
sense syllable followed by a word should be slightly con-
ditioned by the meaning component of the word. For example,
YOF followed by the word "happiness" would result in the
meaning of happiness being weakly conditioned to YOF.
Since a single pairing may not result in empirically mea-
surable conditioning, Staats and Staats felt multiple pair-
ings would be necessary to obtain strong conditioning.
These multiple pairings could not be with the same word,
since direct association of the word and syllable could
then explain the results. Instead, different words with the
same or similar meaning components can be used, since these
common components will strengthen conditioning, while the
other components of the meaning response will differ and,
according to Staats, actually inhibit each other. Thus,
YOF could be consecutively paired with happiness, pretty,
and sweet (Figure 1). The initial pairing would result
in YOF being conditioned weakly to rpv (the positive
value meaning response to happiness), and (all the other
components of the meaning response to happiness). The se-
cond pairing resul'cs in the r bond being strengthenea
4since it has occurred twice, and the R
p
responses tend to
weaken the R^ bond* The third pairing results in further
strengthening of the rpv bond and again Rs serves to inhi-
bit R
H
and R
p
. This assumes that R
R ,
R
p ,
and R
g
have no
systematic meaning components in common. The net result
is that YOF is conditioned to elicit r
.
Pv
Insert Figure 1 about here
To test this hypothesis, Staats and Staats (1957) de-
signed the following experimental procedure, which has been
used in most subsequent studies. The conditioned stimuli
were six nonsense syllables, and the unconditioned stimuli
were words possessing a common evaluative meaning. That
is , the unconditioned stimul i words were all of either
positive or negative evaluative meaning. A number of filler
words were also employed in the procedure which were of neu-
tral evaluative meaning. One syllable was always paired
with words of positive evaluative meaning, one with words
of negative evaluative meaning, and the remaining four were
paired with words of neutral or unsystematic meaning. There
were 108 trials, 18 for each nonsense syllable. The trials
were arranged unsystematical ly , except that no nonsense
syllable appeared in more than two consecutive trials.
Subjects were told they were engaged in two simultan-
eous learning tasks , visual and auditory. That is
,
they
sFigure 1
Conditioning of Meanirg (from Staats and Staats, 1957)
were given a visual learning task, followed by an auditory
learning task. During the actual conditioning phase, the
nonsense syllables were projected onto a screen by means of
a slide projector, and the words were presented orally by
the experimenter one second after the slide appeared on the
screen. Subjects were instructed to repeat the word aloud
and then to continue to repeat the word silently to them-
selves. When the conditioning was completed, the subjects
were asked to write down all the syllables they recalled
and to rate the syllables on a pleasant-unpleasant semantic
differential scale. Awareness of the relation between the
syllables and the words (contingency awareness) was assessed
by asking the subjects to "write down anything you thought
about the experiment, especially anything you thought about
the purpose of the experiment while you were participating
in the experiment." Subjects indicating contingency aware-
ness were excluded from the analysis. Nine of 86 subjects
were classified as aware on the basis of the postexperimental
question and were removed before the data was analyzed.
Staats and Staats based their conditioning of meaning
on Osgood and Suci's (1955; in Staats and Staats, 1957) work
on the components of meaning. Osgood and Suci found that a
large part of the variance in the judgment of meaning could
be accounted for by three factors: evaluation (good-bad),
potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive). In
this study, these three components of meaning were separately
7conditioned to three experimental groups. Significant con-
ditioning of evaluative meaning was found (£ < .001), as
well as for activity and potency.
Staats and his colleagues have since replicated and ex-
tended this work in the classical conditioning of attitudes.
Nonsense syllables were chosen in the original study since
they are presumably devoid of significant meaning, and would
hence be easier to condition. Staats and Staats (1958) also
carried out the evaluative conditioning paradigm described
above with men's names or national names as the conditioned
stimuli. Of the 93 subjects run, 17 were found to be aware
of either or both of the systematic name-word relationships
and were excluded from the analysis. Results for men's
names showed a significant effect for conditioned attitude
(£< .01), and the difference for national names was also
significant <£<.05). The implication of interest here is
that if Staats is correct in his interpretation of these re-
sults as unaware learning of an attitude response, then his
conditioning procedure must be fairly powerful to alter es-
tablished attitudes as in the case of national names. While
nonsense syllables can be expected to be fairly malleable
in evaluative meaning, it is perhaps surprising that a few
massed trials can significantly change an attitude presumably
fairly stable.
A study by Staats and Staats (1959) is of relevance for
this problem. They studied the effect of the number of
sconditioning trials on evaluative conditioning of nonsense
syllables and found that as few as eight trials resulted in
significant conditioning (p_<.05).
Staats, Staats and Heard (1959) found significant se-
mantic generalization of meaning of two evaluatively con-
ditioned words to their synonyms. The words carpet and
rock were conditioned, and then subjects rated their synonyms
rug and stone on the semantic differential scale. Only two
of 163 subjects were aware that pleasant or unpleasant words
were systematically paired with carpet and rock, and none
were aware of the synonym relationship. Significant gener-
alization of conditioned meaning of a word to a word of
similar meaning was found.
All the above research involves higher-order condition-
ing, since words themselves are presumably conditioned in
meaning. The first-order conditioning of evaluative mean-
ing to a nonsense syllable, and the accompanying GSR con-
ditioning, was assessed by Staats, Staats and Crawford
(1962). For this study, shock and loud noise served as
the unconditioned stimuli (UCS). For purposes of later
analysis, it is necessary to discuss the procedure in some
detail. The verbal stimuli were the conditioned stimulus
(CS), a generalization of meaning test word, and 23 filler
words. "Large" was the CS , and "big" was used to test for
generalization. A random list of 77 words was used with
"large" presented .4 times, "big" once, and the rest filler
9words. The subject was told that the experiment concerned
the effect of shock and noise as distractors in a learning
task. The CS was followed by a shock or noise on nine of
the 14 presentations of the CS , while in the control group
the UCS were also presented nine times, but always after a
filler word. The control group can thus be viewed as an
explicitly unpaired control (Rescorla, 1967). Following
the conditioning procedure, subjects were given the semantic
differential to rate six of the words including the CS -and
generalization words. A four-guestion apparently oral in-
terview was then conducted to assess awareness, which in-
cluded the question "Did you anticipate the sound or shock
in any way?" Cf the 28 subjects in the experimental group,
21 were aware that "1 arge" was often followed by a noxious
stimulus, but only two saw any relation of this to the seman-
tic differential rating. It is not explicitly stated that
no subjects were excluded from any of the analyses performed
because of some degree of awareness, but it appears that
none were. Significant GSR conditioning was found for the
CS (jd^.01), although not for the generalization word. The
CS was also rated more unpleasant than the neutral words
(p_<.0005), but again no generalization occurred to the
synonym.
This study is open to criticism on several grounds.
First, the CS is presented 14 times while the other words
apparently appeared only 2 or 3 times. This alone distin-
10
guishes the CS from the filler words and therefore may in-
crease contingency awareness. Secondly, the use of the
explicitly unpaired control design may also elicit greater
awareness. Only the CS is followed by noxious stimuli;
and if one is attending to the repeated CS , it is relatively
easy to discern the connection between the CS and the UCS.
Of course, Staats found 2-1 of 28 subjects to be contingency
aware, although not aware of the connection between the con-
tingency and the rating of the semantic differential. This
type of awareness, awareness of the experimental hypothesis,
has been labeled demand awareness (Orne, 1962). Demand
awareness in this case implies contingency awareness, since
one must know the contingency in order to understand its
relation to the rating scale.
Here it is not clear if the higher rate of awareness is
not also due to the more extensive questions following the
experiment as well as the experimental procedure itself.
An alternative interpretation of the GSR data is that it
can also be explained in terms of cognitive processes rather
than classical conditioning. That is, since most subjects
were aware of the relation between the CS and the noxious
stimuli, it is not surprising that the presentation of a
stimulus that signals a shock or loud noise may induce
anxiety or fear or thoughts resulting in greater arousal.
Some researchers view GSR conditioning as ccgnitively
determined (Baer and Fuhrer, 1968; Baer and Fuhrer, 1970),
11
while others stress the role of cognition in the condition-
ing (Grings, 1973).
So the presentation of the CS may in no way elicit a
simple involuntary response, but instead may elicit thoughts
of the impending aversive stimuli. It would have been of
interest to have the GSR data analyzed separately for aware
and unaware subjects, but this was not done. This explana-
tion is consistent with both the contingency aware and the
demand aware positions, to be more fully explicated below.
Perhaps this cognitively mediated model can still be con-
sidered classical conditioning, but it is not what Staats
intended in explaining his results. If the response is
cognitively mediated, it is not unexpected that no general-
ization will occur to a word of similar meaning. An inter-
esting test would have been to tell subjects that "large"
would no longer be followed by noxious stimuli, but that
another word would. An immediate shift of the GSR response
may have occurred, as was found by Wilson (1968, in Grings)
in a similar GSR conditioning task.
Cohen (1964) investigated the possible role of contin-
gency awareness in being responsible for the conditioning
by replicating Staats and Staats' procedure, with the follow-
ing differences. The experimental group scaled on the seman-
tic differential the six nonsense syllables and also three
that were not presented previously, and a control group
scaled all nine syllables without undergoing the conditioning
12
procedure. Results showed a "general tendency to rate all
six syllables used in the conditioning procedure towards
the pleasant end of the scale.' 1 This was not true for the
control group. This result could conceivably be due to a
familiarity effect (Zajonc, 1968). Of the two conditioned
syllables, YOF was consistently rated more pleasant than
XEH, probably due to pronounciability (Underwood and
Schultz, 1960). A modified form of Staats and Staats'
awareness question was used, as subjects were asked to "write
down anything you thought about the experiment, especially
anything you thought about the purpose of the experiment"
(Staats, 1969). Using a loose criterion of contingency
awareness (1 or more of 3 judges classifying a subject as
aware) t Cohen found 45 subjects unaware of the contingencies
and 52 subjects aware. This is a much higher rate than
Staats and Staats usually obtain, yet a comparison of Staats
and Staats' (1957) overall ratings (without aware subjects)
and Cohen's ratings (with aware subjects) showed great simi-
larity. Cohen found highly significant conditioning for all
subjects (p_< .001), but no effect when aware subjects were
removed
.
Insko and Oakes (1966) manipulated four independent
variables in an investigation of the role of awareness in
the classical conditioning of attitudes. These were evalua-
tion (positive or negative conditioning), color naming (pre-
sent or absent), percentage of reinforcement (50 or 100)
13
and extinction trials (0, 15, or 30). They examined both
contingency awareness and demand awareness. Instead of
using the Staats and Staats procedure, subjects were run
individually, with only three nonsense syllables used.
Color naming between trials was used to interfere with con-
tingency awareness, but presumably not conditioning for half
the subjects. Contingency awareness was assessed through a
seven-question scale, with an eighth direct question assess-
ing awareness of the demand characteristics. The major
findings were that conditioning was significantly correlated
with both contingency and demand awareness for the no-color
naming group, but only for the contingency aware in the
color-naming group (p_<.01). Subjects unaware of the con-
tingency did not condition, but subjects unaware of the de-
mand characteristics did condition. Insko and Oakes thus
interpret their results in terms of contingency awareness
rather than unaware conditioning or demand awareness. Aware
ness of the contingency causes the subject to see the CS as
symbolic of a concept. In this case, for example, YOF may
come to stand for the concept good or pleasant, so subjects
are not just cooperating in rating YOF pleasant. Insko and
Oakes see this rating as representing a cognitive change in
symbolic reference to affect, not in an actual affective
change.
Page (1969) hypothesized that the Staats and Staats
conditioning phenor.ienon was purely a function of demand
14
awareness. According to his interpretation, the subjects
became aware of the contingency between the syllables and
the words. Then utilizing cues provided in the experiment
such as the association patterns and being asked to rate
the syllables on a pleasant-unpleasant semantic differential
scale, they became aware of the experimenter's hypothesis
or, at least, aware of what the experimenter wanted them to
do. Most such subjects then cooperated and rated the syll-
ables very strongly in the correct direction. Page manipu-
lated three variables in a replication of Staats and Staats'
procedure. Psychological sophistication of subjects (begin-
ning versus end of semester), difficulty of interlist asso-
ciation (2, 4, or 10 filler syllables), and direction of
conditioning were all varied.
It was believed that subjects knowing about condition-
ing might be in a better position to respond to demand cues.
Likewise, it was felt that the addition of filler syllables
would make the pattern less obvious and so lead to less
conditioning with more filler items, and more conditioning
with less items. Of course, number of conditioning trials
remained constant. Following the conditioning procedure,
subjects filled out a 17 question postexperimental ques-
tionnaire to assess contingency awareness and demand aware-
ness. Results showed a strong conditioning effect for all
subjects combined (p_^'.001), a significant sophistication
effect (p_\.05), ar.d a significant effect for interlist
difficulty (£<.05). Page found that the best predictor of
conditioning was demand awareness, not contingency aware-
ness. For subjects identified as contingency aware but not
demand aware, conditioning was not significant. Page found
a basically bimodal distribution on rating the syllables,
the demand aware subjects rating them strongly, the rest
rating them near the mid-point.
Staats (1969) replied to his critics, claiming these
results were "not crucial challenges to the author's learning
theory of attitudes, or to the experimental methods of the
author-" For example, the bimodal distribution which Page
found could be due to some subjects who follow the instruc-
tions, and some who do not attend or engage in interfering
strategies. The sophistication finding could be due to
later subjects being informed of the study by earlier sub-
jects. The addition of filler items not only makes the task
less obvious , but al so increases the boredom inherent in
the task and hence inattention . A viable point raised by
Staats is that Page's questionnaire essentially programs
the subject into awareness. Each question teaches the sub-
ject that he has been deceived, and that he should have
noticed a pattern of associ at ion . In a sense, the quest ion-
naire rmay have a demand characteristic of its own. For
what subject likes to admit that he has been fooled? Ac-
cording to Staats, if the subject can recal 1 just a few
items he can figure out the "right" answer. Similarly,
16
in Cohen's study, an essential part of the question Staats
used was dropped—"while you were participating in the ex-
periment." Staats argues that simply rating the syllables
causes some subjects to become aware when they encounter
the question on awareness, even though they were not aware
at the time of rating. At issue is whether subjects see a
pattern in the procedure and cooperate, or whether they are
conditioned and then the conditioning leads to awareness.
A subject successfully conditioned may not need much help
in becoming aware of why he likes a certain syllable.
Page (1974) carried out two studies in which he at-
tempted to manipulate aware subjects. In the first study,
he used the Staats procedure up to the point of rating the
syllables. The control group then continued in the Staats
procedure, but in the reversal group, Page asked subjects
who had "caught on" to the associations between the lists
to rate the syllables in the opposite direction to that
direction they were supposed to, but only for the two syll-
ables for which subjects found a consistent pattern. If
the subject was not aware of a pattern, he was to ignore the
instruction and rate the syllables according to his feelings.
Results showed a switch of conditioning direction in the
reversal group as compared to the control group, even though
both were conditioned in the same direction. In the second
study, subjects were instructed to associate between the
slides and words, cind they showed a large increase in con-
17
ditioning. in neither study above did Page carefully examine
the contingency aware-demand unaware subjects as compared to
the unaware subjects, but this turned out to be unnecessary
since only subjects who were demand aware exhibited condi-
tioning. Staats would probably criticize these studies for
reasons similar to those in his 1969 paper. In the first
study, subjects are told more is going on than what they
may have been aware of, and they may then reflect and figure
out the source of their affect. In the second study, an
increased rate of awareness was correlated with increased
conditioning. Staats is cognizant of this fact and tries to
remove aware subjects.
Recently, O'Donnell and Brown (1973) have studied the
classical conditioning of attitudes of children from 8 to
18. Staats and Staats' general procedure was followed, and
demand and contingency awareness were assessed by means of
a series of 5 open-ended guestions asked in a post-experi-
mental interview,, It was found that contingency awareness
and not demand awareness was the best predictor of condi-
tioning scores, in agreement with Insko and Oakes (1966).
Also found was that increasing age was accompanied by in-
creasing conditioning scores. This finding may be due to
the difficulty younger children may experience in paying
attention to a boring task for a period of time. Also, the
UCS words were not reported, but presumably they were the
same as those used by Staats and Staats (1957). If so, they
18
may have differing meanings and differing impacts at dif-
ferent age levels.
The contingency awareness finding and the increasing
age association with greater conditioning may both be re-
lated to the difficulty younger children may have in telling
an adult experimenter in an oral interview that he was mis-
led as to the purpose of the experiment. So demand aware-
ness may possibly have accounted for the ratings better
than contingency awareness, but one can't tell because of
the nature of the assessment and the subject population.
Staats, et al. (1972) have continued research along
the lines of Staats 1 earlier work. Having extended his
theory of attitudes into what he terms atti tude-reinforcer-
discriminative theory, he tested it by conditioning food-
meaning to a nonsense syllable. Three nonsense syllables
were used, two paired with neutral words and one paired 12
of 16 trials with food'words. The other four trials were
with neutral words. As hypothesized, food-deprived subjects
rated the syllable more pleasantly than satiated subjects.
Two indirect questions were used to assess awareness, rather
than one as was previously done. Again, of course, a demand
characteristic explanation is not eliminated because experi-
mental subjects were told to refrain from eating and were
subsequently presented with food stimuli.
In a comparison of the effectiveness of the Staats,
Insko, and Oakes, and Page methods of assessing awareness,
19
Page (1971) found that the responses to the Page question-
naire correlated most highly with conditioning. Page charged
that the Staats question results in brief, ambiguous answers,
and that the subject may not accurately interpret the ques-
tion. The end result may be a number of false negatives
(awares scored as not aware) who could then account for con-
ditioning results.
Page (1973) compared the effectiveness of indirect,
direct and funnel questionnaires in separating aware and
unaware subjects. Funnel questionnaires begin with indirect
questions and end with direct questions. Assuming that
Staats' classical conditioning of attitudes results are me-
diated entirely by demand characteristics, he used condi-
tioned subjects as a criterion group for awareness. The
funnel questionnaire was found to be the most accurate in
identifying these individuals. Unfortunately, the assump-
tion results in data not meaningful to those who disagree
with it. If Staats' contention that some conditioned but
contingency unaware subjects are led to awareness by the
questionnaire is correct, then Page's results are not neces-
sarily damaging. Page's questionnaire could merely be the
most efficient in programming awareness.
In summary, then, there are three basic positions in
regard to what actually occurs in the classical conditioning
of attitudes procedure. First is Staats' position that
automatic conditioning is occurring without awareness.
20
Classical conditioning of evaluative meaning to a nonsense
syllable occurs through repeated pairings with words having
a common evaluative meaning component. Staats is dealing
with a conditioned reflex, not a conscious concept. Thus
the presentation of YOF , for instance, comes to elicit
stronger and stronger evaluative meaning responses over
conditioning trials.
Second is the position that contingency awareness is
necessary for conditioning, but not demand awareness. That
is, the subject gradually becomes aware that a certain non-
sense syllable is always followed by words of a common
evaluative meaning. The nonsense syllable thus comes to
stand for a concept. Subjects aware of the concept will
therefore rate the syllable in the evaluative direction of
the concept, even without being aware of the demand charac-
teristics.
The third position is that both contingency and demand
awareness are necessary. Subjects must correctly form the
concept of evaluative meaning, and know that the experimenter
expects ratings of the syllables to be in accord with the
evaluative meaning.
The resolution of these three positions hinges on the
method of assessing awareness. Staats claims his method is
efficient in identifying aware individuals, while Page's
questionnaire suggests awareness to the subjects. Page
argues that Staats* method results in a 'number of false
21
positives, and that these false positives were just the ones
who were indeed conditioned. The remaining unaware subjects
did not follow instructions, and thus did not condition.
The present study dealt mainly with the Staats and Page
positions, although the contingency-aware-only subjects
were identified by utilizing Page's assessment technique.
The purpose of the experiment reported here was to give a
fair test to the two theoretical positions of Staats and
Page, and to determine which of two positions best fit the
data.
Three experimental and a control group were run. The
direction of evaluative meaning conditioning was made into
a between-subjects variable because of the desire to keep
the running of the experimental groups reasonably short in
duration. So the basic design was a 2 x 4 factorial between
subjects design. The control group went through a procedure
that closely followed the Staats and Staats conditioning
procedure, with the only meaningful differences being the
use of one evaluative conditioned syllable in a cell of 72
rather than 108 total nonsense syllable-word pairings. The
number of pairings of the syllable to be conditioned and
evaluative words was 18 as in Staats and Staats. Following
the semantic differential ratings of the syllables and the
recall tests of words and syllables, subjects were given the
Staats question on awareness. When they completed this they
filled out a modified form of the Page questionnaire. It
22
was expected that both the Staats and Page findings would
be replicated in the control group. That is, when subjects
judged aware on the basis of the Staats question were re-
moved, significant conditioning would remain. However,
when subjects judged contingency aware or demand aware were
removed, no conditioning effect would remain.
The first experimental group was the countercondition-
ing group. Here the control group procedure was followed
except for the actual conditioning procedure itself. The
conditioning procedure was first done for the opposite
evaluative direction as in the control group, and then re-
peated in the same direction as in the control group. Sub-
jects rated on the semantic differential the conditioned
syllable based on their feelings during the second part.
According to Staats, it was expected that coun tercondi tion-
ing would result in less conditioning than the control group
for unaware subjects.
-This is because of the r and rpv nv
(negative value) bonds tending to inhibit each other result-
ing in a washing out of the effect. It is not known whether
a primacy, recency or neutral effect would occur, but the
crucial point is that any conditioning would be weaker than
the control group. Staats cites counterconditioning in
behavior therapy as "a verification of the classical condi-
tioning theory of attitudes" (1969).
For Page's position, it would be expected that the
first time through :he list would lead some subjects to
23
awareness, who would then attend to the second part because
they knew more is going on than what they were informed,
in the second part, additional subjects who were not aware
in the first part may see the pattern, resulting in greater
conditioning. since Staats fails to remove all the aware
subjects according to Page, then after subjects aware on the
Staats question are taken, out, greater conditioning should
remain in this group than in the control group.
One possible problem with the counterconditioning group
is that a phenomenon similar to the reversal shift pheno-
menon found in operant studies (Kendler and Kendler, 1969)
may result in a sudden swing from one direction of condi-
tioning to the other. Then Staats and Page would have
identical predictions. Although it is not clear that this
would happen, an experimental group was included to avoid
any possibility of a reversal shift while still testing the
above expectations. In the concept formation group, sub-
jects first were conditioned in the same direction as in
the control group but with a filler syllable being condi-
tioned. Then the target syllable was conditioned in the
second part in the same direction as the first part. Ac-
cording to Staats, it was expected that this group would
condition to the same degree as the control group, or per-
haps a little less due to possible conditioning of neutral-
ity on the first part. The demand characteristic position
would predict greater conditioning in the concept formation
24
group than the control, for the same reason as for the coun-
tercondi tioning group.
The third experimental group, labeled the balance
group, again had two conditioning parts. In the first part,
the nonsense syllables all had an equal number of pairings
with evaluative words, thus validating the cover story
since there was no pattern to be found. In the second part,
the evaluative words were paired with the target syllables.
The Staats position would predict little effect on condi-
tioning so that the balance group should approximate the
control group. However, the balanced presentation should
lower contingency awareness and therefore demand awareness,
resulting in less conditioning in the balanced group than
the control group, according to Page. The strongest test I
of these positions would be in comparing the balanced to
the counterconditioning group, since the predictions for the
two positions are diametrically opposed.
METHOD
Sub jects
The subjects were 164 undergraduates attending the
University of Massachusetts, 71 male and 93 female. The
experiment was performed in the summer and fall of 1974,
with subjects receiving either course credit or payment of
$2 for participating in the experiment. Both summer and
fall subjects who received course credit (127) were
25
volunteers from the introductory psychology classes.
Those who were paid were summer students who volunteered
for the experiment (37). The summer introductory psycho-
logy class was too small for purposes of the experiment,
so paid subjects were solicited in the summer.
Apparatus
Slides of nonsense syllables were made with onion-
skin paper and standard mounts. The slides were projected
by means of a Kodak Carousel projector.
Procedure
In general, the procedure was as close as possible to
that of Staats and Staats, except for experimental manipu-
lations. The Staats conditioning list was modified in
the following ways. Since the experimental groups under-
went the conditioning procedure twice, and a between-sub-
ject rather than a within-subject design was employed, the
length of the conditioning presentation was cut from 108
trials to 72. The 18 pairings of YOF with evaluative words
was preserved. YOF, LAJ , and QUG were each presented 18
times, while GIW and WUH were presented nine times each.
The rationale for using five syllables rather than three
or four, each with 18 pairings, was that on the basis of
pilot testing it was believed that three syllables resulted
in easy memorization of the syllables and then subjects
attended to the wcrds only, thus missing the contingency.
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On the other hand, it was feared that excessively long
conditioning sessions would lead to boredom and again in-
attention, especially in the second conditioning phase in
the experimental groups. Thus a relatively short session
with five syllables to learn was thought optimal to main-
tain attention while not causing boredom.
Subjects were run in groups of 3 to 11 in a classroom,
where they were seated individually at a desk or table.
The procedure for all groups was very similar, so the con-
trol group procedure will be described first. Subjects
read and signed an informed consent form, which said they
would be engaged in a task of learning lists of nonsense
syllables and words, and also filling out questionnaires.
Subjects were then given the following instructions.
You are in an experiment concerning the effec-
tiveness of two different types of learning.
One type is visual learning, the other type is
auditory learning. We want to know how both
these types of learning take place together -
the effect that one has on the other and so on.
I am going to show you a series of slides of
nonsense syllables, which are meaningless com-
binations of three letters. You are to watch
and try to remember them. When they are over,
you will be asked to write down all the non-
sense syllables you can recall. Please relax
between the syllables and do not think of any-
thing in particular. Are there any questions?
The nonsense syllables VAF
,
XAD, VEC
,
YIM, and GAH
were then projected on the wall by the slide projector in
random order, with exposure set at five seconds each.
Each syllable was presented four times. At the end of
27
the presentation, subjects were asked to write down all
the nonsense syllables they could recall.
Then subjects were given the auditory learning task of
33 words presented one time each by the experimenter with
approximately two seconds between each word. Subjects
were instructed as fol lows*
I am now going to say a series of words aloud,
one at a time. After I say a word, you are to
immediately repeat the word aloud, and then
continue to say the word to yourself until
the next word is said. Following this, you
will be asked to write down all the words you
can recal 1 within 90 seconds.
The list of words used is presented in Appendix A.
After the presentation, subjects were asked to write down
all the words they could recall within 90 seconds. Then
they were given a recognition task in which they circled
one of two words for a list of 12 pairs of words, depend-
ing on which word of the pair was presented (Appendix B).
Subjects were then given these instructions for the actual
conditioning.
We are now going to do both tasks together.
One list will be of nonsense syllables and
the other will be of words. Here is the
procedure. First, you will see a nonsense
syllable on the wall. Then I will say a
word aloud. You are to repeat that word
aloud and then continue to repeat that word
silently until the next slide appears. You
can learn the syl 1 ables by just looking at them,
si nee each one wi 1 1 be shown many times , but
you should concentrate on saying the words a-
loud and to yourself, since there will be many
words, presented only once.
At this point , the subjects underwent conditioning.
Slides of nonsense syllables appeared for five seconds.
One second after the slide appeared, the experimenter pro-
nounced a word. The list for the positive evaluative
meaning conditioning control group is presented in Table 1
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 2 provides the corresponding list for the nega-
tive evaluative meaning conditioning control group. The
two lists differ only in that one list contains positive
evaluative words and the second contains negative evalua-
tive words.
Insert Table 2 about here
Following the conditioning procedure, all subjects
were given a semantic differential rating booklet for the
five syllables used in the conditioning procedure and one
additional syllable not included. One syllable was pre-
sented on a page, along with a pleasant-unpleasant rating
scale. Subjects were given the following instruction.
We would now like to know how many syllables
you remember. At the same time, we would like
to know how you felt about each syllable since
it may have affected hew you learned the syll-
ables. Please rate the syllables based on how
you felt about them during the final learning
task
.
Subjects were told how to rate syllables on the semantic
differential scale-, and were instructed to circle the
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Table 1
Pairings for Positive Conditioning
1. QUG-with 25. LAJ-leaf 49. YOF-hannv
2. QUG-car 26. GlW-string 50. LAJ — i n to
3. GlW-pen 27. YOF-honest 51. QUG-shoe
4. YOF-beauty 28. LAJ-and 52. YOF-prettv
5. QUG-key 29. WUH-dot ' 53. QUG-glove
6. GlW-chair 30. YOF-smart 54. LAJ-cart
7. YOF- joy 31. YOF-rich 55. QUG-wheel
8. WUH-paper 32. QUG-line 56. WUH-on
9. LAJ-cord 33. YOF-sacrea 57. QUG-dresser
10. YOF-gift 34. GlW-train 58. LAJ-trunk
11. LAJ-book 35. GlW-table 59. QUG-those
12. YOF-sweet 36. YOF-f riend 60. LAJ-fork
13. QUG-letter 37. WUH-can 61. LAJ-eight
14. QUG-ink 38. LAJ-word 62. WUH-note
15. WUH-radio 39. LAJ-pencil 63. YOF-healthy
16. LAJ-four 40. QUG-clock 64. LAJ-stick
17. GIW-cup 41. QUG-of 65. YOF — succes
s
18. QUG-f ive 42. YOF-valuable 66
.
WUH-scck
19. QUG-pot 43. QUG-ship 67. YOF -money
20. WUH-the 44. GlW-room 68. QUG-six
21. LAJ-box 45. GlW-deck 69. YOF-vacation
22. WUH-clay 46. YOF -win 70. YOF-love
23. QUG-this 47. GlW-mop 71. LAJ-water
24. LAJ-sand 48. LAJ-glass 72. LAJ-shirt
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Table 2
rd lnngs r cr Negative Conditioni ng
1X • yUU"W x U 1
1
£ D • T AT 1 _ _ xTLAJ-leaf 49. YOF-stupid
2.*— • OUG-car c.D • uiw-s tring 50 • LAJ-mto
3 U 1 W ^Jcl 1 lUr —worthless 51 • YOF-f ailure
4
.
9ft TAT an^l»aj —ana 57, QUG-shoe
5.
• wun-aot QUG-glove
6. 70 i ur — sour C /l TUT — - 1LAJ-cart
7. YOF-hi tfpr
-J x • i ur -cnciiiy OD • QUG-wneel
8. »KUI 1 Uu U X 7 ? uuu— l ine Db • WUH-on
9. T . A .7— r~H 77
-J J • i ur -crue
i
3 / • QUG-dresser
10 • YOF-ual
v
-J ^ • uxv»*ul alii TAT 4- i rib-
I IX X • T A T-hnnVL O UUU)\ 7^ ulW-LdDI
e
QUG-t nose
1 2X t_ • YOF-sad 36 YOF —H i ri-v/ ^n TAT -f s~\ v~\rLiAJ —rOTK
1 3
• vjuu— l c L Lex 7 7 wu n —can bl • LAJ-eign
t
1 4x *-t • \J x i 1 f\. 7ft "Wo i a & 0D <c • wun—note
X J • l/vUrl"! dUxO 7Q-3:7 • TAT /—y « /»« 4 TLiaJ —penc 1
1
b 3 • YUr -disgusting
X D • XjMJ — x our Li'Jb-C lOCK b4 • TAT ^. 1_ i —. 1 _LAJ— S tlCK
1 7x / • \J J. W —*U U [J 41 • vJUU —O x UJt i ur —agony
1 ft
• u — r l ve VP»P aim' 1I ur —evil DC • WUri —SOCK
19 • QUG-pot 43. QUG-ship 67. YOF-fear
20 • WL'H-the 44. GlW-room 68. QUG-six
21 • LAJ-box 45. GlW-deck 69. YOF-insane
22 • WUH-clay 46. YOF-sick 70. YOF-poison
23 • QUG-this 47. GlW-rnop 71. LAJ-water
24 • LAJ-sand 48. LAJ-glass 72. LAJ-shirt
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syllable if it was one presented during the final learning
task. Next was the word recall test, in which subjects
wrote down all the words they could recall within the allotted
90 seconds. This was followed by the word recognition test,
in which subjects again circled one word of a pair of words
for 12 pairs (Appendix C).
At this point subjects were asked to fill out a sheet
of paper with the Staats awareness question at the top -
"Would you write down anything you thought about the experi-
ment, especially anything you thought about the purpose of
the experiment, while you were participating in the experi-
ment." Subjects were allowed to write as long as they
wished on this measure. When all subjects in a group
finished writing, the Page questionnaire for assessing aware-
ness was given to the subjects. The questionnaire was
modified in order to make it applicable to a between-sub-
ject design and so it was comprehensible to control and
experimental groups. The modified version is found in
Appendix D. Each question was on a separate page of a small
booklet. After finishing the Page questionnaire, subjects
were debriefed individually and excused.
The experimental groups all contained the entire con-
trol group procedure, but in addition each also had a dif-
ferent conditioning phase that preceded the conditioning
procedure found in the control group. For example, the
positive counterccndi tioning group (corresponding to the
32
positive control group) followed the control procedure up
to and including the conditioning instructions, and then
underwent conditioning as in Table 2. As can be seen, the
first conditioning phase was negative conditioning. Fol-
lowing this negative conditioning, subjects were asked to
write down all the nonsense syllables they could recall.
Then they wrote down all the words they could recall with-
in 90 seconds. Finally, a recognition test of 12 word
pairs was given (Appendix C). Then the subjects were -given
the following instructions.
We are now going to do the final learning task.
We wish to measure not only the effect of learn-
ing two lists simultaneously, but also the im-
provement rates from going through the lists a
second time. Again, just look at the syllables,
but concentrate on saying the word I say aloud and
to yourself until the next slide appears.
From this point, the procedure was identical to that
of the positive evaluative conditioning control group.
The subjects were then given the conditioning procedure
again,, with the difference of positive evaluative meaning
words replacing the negative evaluative words. The nega-
tive counterconditioning group simply had the order of the
two lists reversed.
The concept formation group manipulation that preceded
the regular conditioning phase was the pairing of QUG with
evaluative words, while YOF was paired with neutral words.
For the positive concept formation group QUG was paired
with positive worcs, and for the negative concept forma-
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ticn group QUG was paired with negative words. Again, re-
call and recognition tests were given, followed by the in-
structions for the "final learning task."
For the balanced group, all five syllables received
an equal proportion of pairings with evaluative words,
randomly determined as to placement. Again, this condi-
tioning phase was followed by the recall and recognition
tests and by the instructions for the "final learning task."
Judging
The answers to the two questionnaires were judged for
awareness by two undergraduates trained by the experimenter
and who were paid for their efforts. The judges were first
given just the Staats question sheets and at no time saw
the semantic differential ratings. Answers to the Staats
question were judged as evidencing contingency awareness
or no awareness. Contingency awareness was scored as being
aware that YOF was paired with one or more pleasant (or
unpleasant) words.
The Page questionnaire scoring followed the guide-
lines in Page (1969). However, judges included the answer
to the Staats question in the Page questionnaire. Judges
had scored all the Staats answers before beginning the
Page questionnaire. They were told that it was perfectly
acceptable to change their scoring on awareness for the
Page questionnaire since they had additional information.
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Questionnaires were scored for contingency awareness and
for demand awareness. To be scored demand aware, a sub-
ject had to be contingency aware and to know that this
contingency should influence the rating on the semantic
differential. Subjects who were demand aware were also
scored on cooperation-resistance in relation to cooperating
with the experimental demand. All three judgments were
made on the four-point scale used by Page. For both aware-
ness measures, ratings were clearly aware, probably aware,
probably unaware, and clearly unaware. Analogous designa-
tions were used for the cooperation-resistance measure.
RESULTS
Reliability
The initial ratings of awareness on the Staats ques-
tion by the judges were correlated, with a resulting Pear-
son product-moment r_ of .96. Judges disagreed on only one
of 164 subjects, and this subject was subsequently scored
as aware by a third judge. Twelve subjects were scored as
aware and 152 as unaware.
Next the reliability was computed for the Page ques-
tionnaire on contingency awareness, with an r_ of .82 re-
sulting. Subjects who were classified by one judge as
either clearly aware or probably aware and by the other
judge as clearly or probably unaware were reclassified by
the judges in a meeting in which they reconsidered their
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initial judgments. Eleven subjects were reclassified in
this way, resulting in 21 contingency aware and 143 un-
aware subjects. This procedure was also done for the de-
mand awareness and cooperation-resistance measures. The
reliability for the demand aware judgments was r = .74,
with disagreement as to the dichotomy demand aware-unaware
on nine subjects. Fifteen subjects were found demand aware
and 149 were not. Of the demand aware subjects nine were
scored as cooperators and five as resistors, based primarily
on self-ratings of the subject on the Page guestionnaire.
Initial Analyses
Because of the season (summer/fall) variable and the
payment (money/credit) variable being added to the original
design, it was thought useful to eliminate these variables
if possible in order to increase sample sizes within cells.
The effect of these factors were separately examined in
terms of two dependent variables, semantic differential
ratings and awareness scores. For the semantic differen-
tial ratings, mean scores were calculated for each cell in
the two control and six experimental groups. Neither the
season nor the payment factor was significant, althcugh
it was impossible to check for interactions because of
empty cells. No consistent pattern could be found, how-
ever, that would indicate a possible interaction. Simi-
larly, no effects were evident on the Staats awareness
classification or the Page contingency awareness classifi-
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cation. Because of these results, the season and payment
variables were dropped from the analysis. Variables that
were included in subsequent analyses were sex, experimen-
tal group, direction of conditioning and awareness.
Semantic Differential Ratings
A 2 x 2 x 4 (Direction x Sex x Group) analysis of
variance was performed on all subjects (N = 164) for the
semantic differential rating. Overall, a significant dif-
ference was found for direction (F(l,148) = 6.50, £<.025),
as shown in Table 3. No other effects were significant.
A second 2x2x4 analysis of variance was then done after
the 12 subjects who were scored as aware on the Staats
question were removed. The direction effect disappeared,
and again no other effect was significant. A third analysis
of variance was carried out after the 21 subjects who were
contingency aware on the Page questionnaire were removed
(of the Staats-aware subjects, one was scored as not being
contingency aware on the Page questionnaire and was re-
entered into the analysis). No significant differences were
found. Finally, an analysis of variance was performed on
the subjects who were not demand aware on the basis of the
Page questionnaire. Seven subjects who were contingency
aware but not demand aware were re-entered for this analy-
sis. Again, no significant differences were found.
Insert Table 3 about here
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Table 3
Summary of the Analysis of Variance Performed on
Two Directions of Conditioning, Two Sexes, and Four Groups
Source df MS F
Direction (A) 1 23.70 6.50*
Sex (B) 1 1.76 .48
Group (C) 3 3.41 .93
A x B 1 .095 .08
A x C 3 1.911 .52
B x C 3 2.83 .77
A x 3 x C 3 1.69 .46
Error 148
* £ <.05
The above analyses were done on subjects on the basis
of various definitions of being unaware. That is, after
the initial analysis of variance, Staats-aware subjects
were removed, and then Page contingency aware subjects
were removed. It was impossible to perform the same analy-
sis of variance on aware subjects because of very small
numbers per cell. However, means for all groups of aware
and unaware subjects are shown in Table 4. The row head-
ings list the groups, while the column headings present
the various classifications of the subjects on the basis
of awareness. The cells contain the mean semantic dif-
ferential ratings along with the N. The far left column
presents the cell means for all subjects in the eight groups
Since a significant difference was found only for all sub-
jects, contrasts between group means were performed to de-
termine the source of the difference. The control group
contrast was marginally significant (Fy(l,148) = 3.29,
p_<.3.0), as was the contrast for the countercondi tioning
group (Fr(l,148) = 2.95, £<.10). The contrast for the
concept formation group was non-significant, as was the
contrast for the balanced group. So no group contrast was
responsible for the overall directional effect, but there
was a trend for most of the difference between pleasant
and unpleasant cells to be in the control and countercon-
ditioning groups. All groups were in the predicted direc-
tion, however, anc so contributed to the overall effect.
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Insert Table 4 about here
In examining the Staats-aware column of Table 4, it
can be seen why the significant direction effect vanished
upon removal of these subjects. In general, the Staats
aware subjects show extreme conditioning, and their removal
attenuates the mean differences for the Staats unaware group
However, the group means are still all in the predicted
direction of pleasant groups having lower mean scores than
the unpleasant groups. The Page contingency aware subjects
again show strong conditioning, while their removal results
in virtually no difference in cell means. Obviously,
there was no significant difference between the Staats-
awareness cell means, but the directional patterns between
cells was always in the right direction. The Page demand
aware subjects, as expected, showed consistent strong con-
ditioning. Of interest here is that when the six subjects
who were contingency aware but demand unaware were included
in the Page demand unaware column, the consistent direc-
tional pattern re-emerged.
These six subjects were examined separately to see how
strongly they conditioned and to see how clearly they were
not demand aware. Of the six subjects, two were from the
pleasant control group, one from the unpleasant control
group, one was from the pleasant balanced group, and two
were from the unpleasant balanced group. The semantic
c
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differential scores of the subjects in the unpleasant con-
ditions were subtracted from eight to obtain a corrected
conditioning score. That is, for all subjects a score of
one indicated strong conditioning. The mean corrected
conditioning score for all six subjects was 1.67, due to
the most extreme ratings by all but one subject. All but
one subject was rated as unaware on the Staats question,
and all received ratings of clearly aware on the Page con-
tingency awareness measure (X = 1.0). Mean ratings on the
demand awareness measure for these subjects was 3.75,
toward the clearly unaware end of the scale. In summary,
these six subjects showed very strong conditioning, were
not identified as aware by the Staats question, were all
rated as clearly contingency aware on the basis of the
Page questionnaire, but were not demand aware.
The 14 demand aware subjects were initially classi-
fied by judges on a 4-point scale of cooperation-resistance.
For purposes of a t-test between cooperators and resistors,
and because of the small size of the group, it was neces-
sary to reduce the four categories to two (cooperators
and resistors). This resulted in nine cooperators and five
resistors. The semantic differential scores again were
corrected for direction of conditioning, and a significant
difference was found between the cooperators and resistors
on the one-tailed _t-test (_t(12) = 1.92, £ <.05). The ef-
fect was in the expected direction but was surprisingly
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weak, perhaps partially because of the small sample size.
Awareness
Another dependent variable that was examined was
awareness. A 2 x 4 (Direction x Group) analysis of variance
was carried out on the Page contingency awareness ratings
on the 4 point scale. No significant effects were found.
No analysis of variance was done on the Staats aware-
ness data since only a two point scale was used in scor-
ing and only 12 subjects of 164 were aware, resulting in
a grossly skewed distribution. However, a chi-square test
for frequency of awareness among the four groups was at-
tempted after collapsing across direction of condition-
ing to increase the N. No significant difference was found,
although according to Siegel (1956) the assumptions of the
test were grossly violated since 50% of the expected values
were under five. Twenty percent under five is the upper
limit of the test.
A similar aware/unaware by group chi-square was com-
puted for the Page contingency aware data. It was expected
that certain groups should have greater awareness than
others. For example, the balanced group was designed to
inhibit contingency awareness, while the countercondition-
ing and concept formation groups were meant to enhance it.
No difference in frequency of awareness was found between
qroups, but again the expected values assumption was vio-
lated with two of the eight cells having expected values
under five.
Because of the assumption violations in these two
cases, it was decided to combine the countercondi tioning
and concept formation groups in order to conduct the x 2
test properly. When this was done for the Staats awareness
data, 17% of the expected values were under five. Again,
no significant effect was discovered. For the Page contin-
gency measure, a weak effect was found (x 2 (2) = 5.73,.
£<.10), with no expected value less than five. This ten-
dency was due mainly to the disparity between the expected
and observed values for the control group, with a greater
frequency of aware subjects observed in this group than
expected.
Correlational Analysis
The semantic differential ratings, Staats awareness
scores, Page contingency awareness scores and Page demand
awareness scores were intercorrelated by means of Pearson
product-moment correlations after correcting the condition-
ing scores. The results are shown in Table 5. All corre-
lations were highly significant. The semantic differential
ratings correlated most highly with the Page contingency
awareness measure, next most with the Page demand awareness
measure, followed by the Staats awareness question. This
ordering of correlations was checked for significance by
means of _t-tests, and the following results were obtained.
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Insert Table 5 about here
The semantic differential ratings' correlation with
the Staats item (.23) was significantly lower than its
correlation with the Page contingency awareness measure
(tU61) = 2.55, £<.02). Similarly, the correlation of
the semantic differential ratings with the demand aware-
ness measure (.29) was significantly lower than the corre-
lation with the contingency awareness measure (t(161) =
2.15, £ < .05). The correlation of the semantic differen-
tial ratings with the Staats item was not significantly
different from the correlation of the semantic differen-
tial ratings with the demand awareness measure. Thus,
contingency awareness is more highly correlated with the
semantic differential ratings than either the Staats aware-
ness item or demand awareness.
The intercorrelations of the Staats awareness item
and contingency and demand awareness scores are very high,
as would be expected since all are measuring the same or
similar things. The contingency awareness/demand aware-
ness correlation of .80 is due to the fact that by defini-
tion all demand aware subjects are contingency aware, and
all but six contingency aware subjects were scored as being
demand aware. More interesting is the relation between the
Staats awareness item, and the contingency and demand aware
ness measures. Both correlations are quite high (.64 and
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Table 5
Summary of Correlations Among Four Variables
Semantic differential
ratings
2 3 4
.23* .39* .29*
S taats wareness
ratings
.46*
.
72*
Page contingency aware-
ness ratings
.80*
Page demand awareness
ratines
* £< .001
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.72), but it was unexpected that the direction of the order-
ing of the correlations would be with demand awareness cor-
relating more highly with the Staats measure than contin-
gency awareness. After all, the Staats item was designed
to assess contingency awareness, not demand awareness.
To check the possibility of the difference between the cor-
relations being significant, a t-test was performed. it
was found that the Staats awareness measure was signifi-
cantly more highly correlated with demand awareness than
with the Page contingency awareness measure (_t(161) =
2.23, rjC.05). This effect could be accounted for by two
factors. First, the Page contingency awareness measure
picked up more subjects as aware than did the Staats assess-
ment. The aemand aware group was comparable in size to the
Staats aware group. Secondly, it was precisely those sub-
jects that the Staats measure did not score as aware that
were found as contingency aware but not demand aware. It
will be recalled that of these six subjects, five were
scored as unaware by the Staats assessment, and all were
scored as unaware of the experimental demand.
Recall Test Analysis
After the data were collected and analyzed, it was
decided to also check the relation of the corrected condi-
tioning score to the recall of words. It was thought that
this analysis might possibly shed some light on the failure
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to replicate the results of Staats and Page. An inverse
relation between number of words recalled and the degree
of conditioning might indicate inattention on the part of
the subjects to the slides. Perhaps they quickly learned
the syllables and then mainly listened to the words, thus
missing the contingency. A positive relation could best
be interpreted as demonstrating attention, and then "catch-
ing on" in Page's viewpoint or conditioning in Staats*
view. Analysis was done by counting the number of words
correctly recalled after the conditioning procedure for
the control groups. For the experimental groups, the score
was taken from the number of words correctly recalled after
the first conditioning phase. This was done because in this
way all subjects had had only one time through the list.
Results of the Pearson correlation were not significant
(£ = .07), and are best viewed in terms of the crude nature
of the recall measure. Certainly many variables contri-
bute to the number of words correctly recalled other than
attention. In terms of Page's model, it is the affective
words that matter, and even here only one or two words
necessarily are learned in order to become contingency
aware. In Staats' theory, no relation is necessary. In
fact, those who follow instructions best won't rehearse
previous words during the presentation of a new slide.
Thus, little learning of words would be expected.
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Boredom Self-Ratings
To examine the possible role of boredom in the experi-
mental results, the answers to the final question added to
the Page questionnaire (Appendix D) was used to compute
cell means. The question was "How did you feel during
the experiment?", and subjects rated themselves on a 7-
point scale from very bored to very interested. For the
positive conditioning groups, no pattern was evident, but
for the negative conditioning groups, the control group
was significantly less bored than the experimental groups
(t_(74) = 2.11, £<.05). It is not clear why a directional
difference should emerge, rather than a main effect for
control groups versus experimental groups. If this dif-
ference in rated boredom for the negative conditioned
groups was meaningful, it should have had some impact on
conditioning scores or contingency awareness. Thus, a
group by direction interaction would be expected for all
subjects if, for example, boredom was mediating attention.
No such interaction was found for any grouping of semantic
differential ratings based on awareness, nor for the con-
tingency awareness analysis of variance. This would seem
to rule cut boredom as an important factor in the results,
although it does not necessarily rule out attention, which
was not assessed directly.
DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment were generally incon-
clusive, because the control group failed to replicate
Staats' (1957) results, and the manipulations failed to
have their intended effects. In terms of the first prob-
lem, the mean semantic differential ratings for the two
control groups did not differ significantly after removal
of the subjects classified aware on the basis of Staats'
criterion. Even before their removal, with all subjects
entered, the control groups differed only marginally
(p_<.10). In this way, the control groups also failed
to replicate the results of Page (1969). It is only when
ell subjects for all groups are entered into the analysis
of variance that a significant direction effect emerges,
but it is still less powerful than the results obtained by
Page.
The second problem is related to the first. The coun-
terconditioning and concept formation groups were intended
to increase contingency awareness and demand awareness,
while the balanced group was designed to decrease contin-
gency awareness. That they did not have these effects is
evidenced by the analysis of variance for the Page contin-
2gency awareness scores, by the x test for frequency of
2Staats awareness among groups , and the analogous x for
Page contingency awareness* In the last test, a weak
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tendency (£ <.10> was found for the control group to have
a higher frequency of contingency awareness than did the
experimental groups.
This result, along with the marginal result of the
control groups contrast for the initial analysis of
variance, might provide grounds for explaining the incon-
clusive results. Of course, as in all post-hoc explana-
tions, speculation, must be labeled as just that unless I
supported by evidence. If the interpretation can be made
that the control group is both conditioning a bit more and
becoming contingency aware more than the other groups,
then two causes for this tendency can be suggested.
First, the control group conditioning procedure was shorter
than the experimental groups procedure. While the control
group had 72 word-slide pairings, the experimental groups
had 144. Staats and Page used 108 pairings. Thus, if
longer slide presentations led to inattention, less condi-
tioning would have been expected in the experimental groups,
especially since this inattention would have been greatest
during the crucial second time through the conditioning
procedure. Of course, this factor alone would lead one
to expect greater conditioning in the control group than
in the Staats and Page studies. Reasons why this did not
occur are discussed below.
A second possibility is related to the fact that con-
trol subjects were generally run early in the experiment,
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while the experimental subjects were usually run later.
It is possible that the experimenter displayed greater
enthusiasm or expressiveness during the early sessions,
or conversely, more boredom later in the course of the ex-
periment. In either case, one could again postulate greater
attention in the control group. Staats (1969) observed that
pronouncing the positive UCS words in a positive manner and
the negative UCS words in a negative manner led to greater-
conditioning and awareness, although it is not known if
this effect extends to general expressiveness. For both
of these possible explanations of results, the boredom
data do not support the role of attention although no direct
measure of attention was used.
If the lack of significant conditioning in this ex-
periment was not due to boredom leading to inattention,
then the possibility exists that many subjects who were
truly conditioned were being misclassif ied as aware and
thus removed from the conditioning analyses. But a compari-
son of awareness rates across attitude conditioning studies
reveals that the present study has a clearly lower rate of
awareness than other studies, as shown in Table 6. The
columns list the different methods of classifying subjects
as aware in the past, either by Staats' general measure of
awareness, contingency awareness (omitting demand aware
subjects), demand awareness, or combined contingency and
demand awareness. In every category, the present study
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has the lowest rate of awareness, especially so in demand
awareness. If too many false positives accounts for a lack
of replication and a lack of experimental effects, then a
higher rather than a lower rate of awareness would be ex-
pected. Since the rate of awareness in this study is con-
sistently lower, it seems unlikely that conditioned sub-
jects are being miscl assif ied. So if subjects are not in-
correctly being found aware, and are not conditioning,
then the conditioning procedure is having little effect.
Insert Table 6 about here
A possible reason for this is that one difference be-
tween the present control group procedure and the usual
Staats and Staats procedure is that this experiment used
direction of conditioning as a between-sub j ects variable
while most other studies used it as a within-sub jects vari-
able. Thus, Staats and Staats (1957, 1958), Page (1969),
Cohen (1964), and O'Donnell and Brown (1973) used a within-
subjects design. Other studies using a between subjects
design differed in important respects from the present
study. For example, Staats, Staats, and Crawford (1962),
as described above, used a procedure conducive to producing
contingency awareness. Insko and Oakes (19G6) used only
three nonsense syllables, each with 18 pairings, while the
present study used five. Thus it may be argued that the
contrast between pleasant and unpleasant words within the
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Table 6
Percentage of Aware Subjects in Various
Classifications in Various Studies
Staats Contin- Demand Total
Method % gency Aware % Aware %
Aware %
oLdaLo ailQ
Staats '57 10 10
Staats and
Staats '58 18 18
Cohen
•64 54* 54
Insko and
Oakes '66 8 45 53
Pa <3e
, 69 6 32 39
King 7
f 4 9 7 or 13**
• Modified Staats question used
** Total Staats assessed awareness and total Page assessed
awareness, respectively
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conditioning session increases the salience of the plea-
santness dimension, thereby increasing the ease of becom-
ing contingency aware. While this factor may serve to in-
crease awareness, it is doubtful that this should have any
effect on unaware conditioning.
In spite of the general low level of awareness, sub-
jects did become aware to differing extents and so the
correlational results of the corrected semantic differen-
tial ratings and the various measures of awareness deserve
discussion. As expected, conditioning was found to be
highly correlated with awareness. It was not expected,
however, that contingency awareness would be the best
predictor of conditioning scores. This result is directly
opposed to Page's correlational results, where demand
awareness was found to be the best predictor. Indeed,
Page's contingency aware/demand unaware subjects failed to
exhibit conditioning. In contrast, in the present study
the six contingency aware/demand unaware subjects showed
strong conditioning. They were also judged fairly strongly
as being contingency aware but not demand aware. Thus,
in this experiment it must be concluded that demand aware-
ness is not necessary for conditioning to occur, contrary
to Page's conclusions. These results for contingency
awareness are quite in line with those of Insko and Oakes,
but these experimenters found a correlation of essentially
zero between demard awareness and conditioning. The
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difference between their study and the present one as well
as Page's results could be due to their scoring demand
awareness on a continuum where a subject was scored as more
aware than a naive subject even for an incorrect hypothesis,
and to the use of an oral interview which could conceivably
inhibit the revelation of the hypothesis. They also failed
to separate resistors and cooperators in their analysis
of demand awareness.
An interesting finding was that classification of - sub-
jects on. the basis of the Staats item was more highly cor-
related with demand awareness than contingency awareness.
This may be explained by assuming that those subjects who
are demand aware will be most likely to be concerned with
the contingency. If they know the contingency should in-
fluence their ratings, then the contingency is fairly sa-
lient. If they are only contingency aware, they may fail
to mention the fact on their answer to the Staats item since
it is not salient to them. After all, they are not aware
of any relation of the contingency to any other part of
the experiment, and so may fail to mention it in their ans-
wer to the Staats item. It will be recalled that five of
the six contingency aware subjects were not scored as such
by the Staats question. Since they were not asked directly
about an irrelevant fact (the contingency), it was not men-
tioned in their answer.
If we assume that the lack of a contrast was responsible
56
for a general lowered level of awareness, then the failure
to obtain conditioning after Staats-aware subjects were
removed may be due to a factor possibly peculiar to this
experiment. The subjects in this experiment were given the
Staats question and then were not given or informed about
the Page questionnaire until all had finished answering it.
Since subjects were run in small groups and were therefore
in close visual contact with the experimenter, they may have
felt an implicit demand to continue writing, since they may
have concluded the experiment was over, but were not allowed
to leave. If so, more aware subjects would be likely to
write something that would identify them as such, and result
in the disappearance of the conditioning effect.
Since none of the hypotheses could be adequately tested
in this study, the results can be interpreted in terms of
any of the three positions on awareness. In Staats' case,
this means 164 subjects were given the conditioning proce-
dure, but very few, if any, conditioned without becoming
aware. That those who did become aware, rated the nonsense
syllable in the direction of the conditioning, is hot harm-
ful to his position. Failure to achieve conditioning with-
out awareness here does not disprove Staats' hypothesis,
but when coupled with the other studies cited, it seems
damaging. It seems at best that unaware conditioning is
closely tied to becoming aware. When postexperimental
questioning more extensive than Staats'* is used, no
conditioning is found without awareness. If subjects
condition and then become aware during the postexperimental
inquiry, then very few subjects condition without aware-
ness who do not figure out the contingency and perhaps the
demand at that time. One wonders where the subjects are
who condition without awareness, but are unable to deduce
the source of their evaluative response during the inquiry.
This type of subject is lacking in all but Staats' own
studies. It is quite possible that automatic conditioning
of evaluative response can occur, but it either creates
awareness or leads to the threshold of awareness. After
all, we are dealing with a verbal stimulus and a verbal
reinforcer, and awareness is closely linked with the verbal
system.
The demand aware position is damaged in that it was
found that conditioning can occur without demand awareness.
Certainly being aware of the experimental demand did not
harm conditioning, but it was not as good a predictor of
cond;. tioning as contingency awareness. Indeed, some of
those demand aware mav resist the demand and thus fail to
show cond i tioning . The di f ference between cooper a tors and
resistors in this study was weak
,
especial ly since subjects
can look back at their semantic di f f erential rating and re-
troactively decide whether they cooperated or resisted.
The most parsimonious explanation of the data was in
terms of contingency awareness , based on the correlational
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analysis. Some subjects became aware of the relation be-
tween the words and syllables and rated them accordingly
because of the concept they came to stand for. it is guite
possible, however, that these subjects were conditioned
to awareness. The present experiment cannot distinguish
between this possibility and the position that learning
took place at a more cognitive level.
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Appendix A
Brief
Large
Blue
Stool
Shingle
Blanket
Supper
Tree
Belt
Outside
Hammer
Lawyer
Highway
Overcoat
Movie
Forward
Backpack
Underground
Elephant
Shirt
Run
Motor
Apple
Street
Card
Ocean
Dog
Cotton
Black
Storeroom
Vil laqe
Tape
Switch
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Appendix B
CIRCLE ONE OF EACH PAIR
BRIEF OR BRIEFCASE
LARGE OR SMALL
OVER OR OVERCOAT
CAT OR DOG
RUN OR WALK
STORE OR STOREROOM
UNDER OR UNDERGROUND
OUT OR OUTSIDE
BLACK OR BLACKBOARD
VILLAGE OR TOWN
SUPPER OR DINNER
HIGH OR HIGHWAY
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Appendix C
I CIRCLE ONE OF EACH PAIR
WATER OR WATERFALL
DRESS OR DRESSER
LEAF OR LEAFLET
STICK OR TWIG
INK OR INKWELL
BLOUSE OR SHIRT
GLASS OR MUG
RAILROAD OR TRAIN
KETTLE OR POT
MUD OR SAND
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Appendix D
Modified Page Questionnaire
I. What was the purpose of this experiment and what wereyou supposed to do?
you ever have the idea thatits purpose might be something other than what I wastelling you? What?
3. Thinking back to the experiment, did you notice at thetime any relationship between certain syllables on the
screen and the words that were spoken?
4. If you noticed any relationship between the lists, isthis something you were actually aware of during the
experiment or is it something you thought of whilefilling out these questions?
5. Do you remember approximately when it was that you
noticed this? Describe the point in the experiment
at which this occurred.
6. What did you think was the purpose of the rating scales
at the time you were filling them out, if anything?
7. How did you go about deciding what rating to give the
various nonsense syllables?
8. Did you think that the experimenter might have expected
that you would rate certain of the nonsense syllables
in any certain way? Explain.
9. Was your answer to Question 8 something you were actu-
ally aware of before or during the marking of the rating
scales, or something you thought of afterwards?
10. In the final learning task, what syllable was always
or usually paired with the travel words?
a. How certain are you of this or are you guessing?
Guessing
: : :
: : : Certain
b. Is this something you were aware of during the
experiment or something you thought of since?
Please explain if necessary.
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11. In the final learning task, what syllable was always orusually paired with words of pleasant meaning?
Y
a. How certain are you of this or are you guessing?Guessing
: : : : : : Certain
b. Is this something you were aware of during the
experiment or something you thought of sinr-e?
Please explain if necessary.
12. in the final learning task, what syllable was always
or usually paired words of unpleasant meaning?
a. How certain are you of this or are you guessing?
Guessing
: : :
.
.
. Certain
b. Is this something you thought of during the ex-
periment or something you thought of since?
Please explain if necessary.
13. Were you ever aware during the experiment that during
the final learning task, YOF was always paired with
words of unpleasant meaning or conotation?
And, if so, were you aware of any effect this might
have had on you as you marked the rating scales?
Explain.
14. Assuming that you knew the unpleasant word and what was
expected on the marking of the rating scales, rate your
attitude while marking the rating scales.
Resist the Mark the
influence
:
"j
:
: : ; right answers
15. Please make any other comments that you feel might help
us understand your reaction to this experiment.
16. Have you had any previous courses in psychology such
as in high school? Have you had introductory psycho-
logy in college?
17. Do you know the meaning of the term conditioning?
If so, did you think about it during the experiment?
18. How did you feel during the experiment?
Very interested : :
:
: : ; Very bored

